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Abstract
In Content Centric Networks, where one retrieves data based on a given name, not a conventional connection to a server or
other device, there is a need for a standard mechanism to establish bi-directional streams. We describe a method to open
and maintain such conversations using the techniques of a named data network.
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Introduction
CCNx Bidirectional Streams describes how two parties may
open bidirectional data streams using networking techniques
of CCNx. In CCNx, prates exchange data based on descriptive
names of the data, not on machine addresses. This allows for
more diverse forms of networking than traditional TCP/IP.
In some cases, however, parties may still wish to directly
exchange byte streams between two “live” applications and
thus need the techniques described here.
Bidirectional Streams describes a Basic Setup and Authen-
ticated Setup. In Basic Setup, the parties do not authenticate
each other upfront, but defer it to later optional verification
of the exchanged data. In Authenticated Setup, both parties
authenticate each other before exchanging data, and they may
optionally use data encryption.
Section 1 describes the Content Centric Networking (CCN)
approach to Named Data and previous work on Voice over
CCN that solved a specific type of bi-directional data. Sec-
tion 2 presents this paper’s contribution on Bidirectional
Streams and describes both basic setup and authenticated
setup. Section 3 describes how Bidirectional Streams works
when an initial setup request does not reach the best site to
service the stream, and the request is forwarded to a different
site.
1. CCNx Overview
In a Content Centric Network (CCN) [1], devices exchange
data on a network based on descriptive names for the data,
not on machine addresses such as in Internet Protocol. In
summary, CCN is based on the exchange of Interest messages
asking for content and Content Objects that contain data. A de-
vice requests content by issuing an Interest for the data using a
name, such as ”ccnx:/newyorktimes/frontpage”. The Interest
travels through the network until a device has a corresponding
Content Object with a matching name. The matching Content
Object travels on the Interest’s reverse path and provides the
data to the original device.
The Interest/Content Object exchange is a uni-directional
flow of data. The Interest contains a name prefix that enables
the message to be routed over a network and usually contains
information needed to select a specific content object or ini-
tiate a specific service at the Interest consumer. Application
data then travels back in response to the Interest using a sim-
ilar name to the Interest. What is missing is a conventional
way to establish bi-directional data exchanges using simple
names.
Bidirectional streams over Named Networks extends the
methods originally proposed for Voice over CCN (VoCCN) [2].
VoCCN describes a method to initiate a Voice-over-IP conver-
sation by exchanging SIP messages in Interests and Content
Objects, then using bi-directional named streams for the Real
Time Protocol (RTP) packet exchange. We generalize this
method for arbitrary data connections between devices.
1.1 Voice over CCN
In Voice over CCN (VoCCN), a caller sends a specially formed
Interest to the callee. The Interest contains the routable name
of the callee and also encodes a SIP Invite [3] and a symmetric
encryption key. The symmetric encryption key is encrypted
with the callee’s public key, so only they can decrypt it. The
SIP Invite is encrypted with the symmetric key. The callee
inspects the SIP Invite and extracts the caller’s identity, which
includes their routable name and the call-id. The callee cre-
ates a response Content Object that includes the callee’s SIP
ar
X
iv
:1
70
7.
04
73
8v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 15
 Ju
l 2
01
7
CCNx 1.0 Bidirectional Streams — 2/4
Accept. Based on these exchanges over CCN, the caller and
callee can create a bi-directional RTP [4] flow, that is option-
ally encrypted with the symmetric key.
2. Bidirectional Streams
To establish bi-directional streams, at least one party must
register to receive Interests on a service name for service
rendezvous. The initiator sends to the service name an Inter-
est that specifies the initiator’s stream name. The provider
responds with a Content Object that contains the provider’s
stream name. The parties may now exchange data over the
two streams using segmented Content Objects. When one
party is done writing to its stream, it indicates the final seg-
ment by setting the FinalBlockID of the ContentObject to that
final segment number. If no final data is necessary, sets the
Content size to zero. When the second party is done writing
to its stream, it closes it with the same technique.
We use the notation Int: <name> to indicate an Inter-
est with the name <name>. Other CCN selectors may appear
to facilitate reading a CCN stream, but for brevity we do not
detail them here. We use the notation Obj: <name> ::
<contents> to represent a Content Object with the name
<name> and its payload contents <contents>. We assume
the contents are encoded using a standard method, such as
XML objects or CCNB encoding. The actual stream pay-
loads, noted as “Data” exchanges in Fig. 1, have arbitrary user
bytes as payload and are not interpreted by the bidirectional
protocol.
Fig. 1 depicts the basic setup mechanism. Bob has reg-
istered to receive interests for the name /bob/srvname.
Alice sends Bob an Interest where the last name component
encodes Alice’s stream name /alice/strmid_a, where
strmid_a is a locally unique random number. Bob responds
with an Accept Content Object. The object’s name exactly
matches the Interest’s name and contains the Name of Bob’s
stream name, where strmid_b is a locally unique random
number. Bob also begins expressing Interests for the first seg-
ment of Alice’s stream. Once Alice receives the Accept object,
she begins expressing Interests for Bob’s stream. The two
parties now exchange data over segmented Content Objects.
Bidirectional stream readers should use flow control and
re-express Interests for missing segments. The particulars of
flow control and retransmissions are beyond the scope of this
document.
In Basic setup, Alice may assure herself that the Accept
object came from Bob, because like all CCN Content Objects,
it is signed by Bob.
One problem with basic stream setup is that Bob has no
assurance that Alice is sending him a valid stream name. It
could be the impostor Eve trying to DDoS Bob by causing
him to generate Accept objects, or DDoS Alice by having Bob
flood Alice with Read Interests. In Section 2.2 we discuss
using authenticated setup.
Alice	   Bob	  
Int	  :	  /bob/srvname/{/alice/strmid_a}	  
Obj:	  /bob/srvname/{/alice/strmid_a}	  	  	  
::	  /bob/strmid_b	  
Int	  :	  /bob/strmid_b/%00	  
Int	  :	  /alice/strmid_a/%00	  
Exchange	  byte	  streams	  using	  
Content	  Object	  segments	  
Close	  using	  FinalBlockID	  
More	  data	  
Close	  using	  FinalBlockID	  
Open	  
Read	  
Accept	  
Read	  
Data	  Data	  
Close	  
Data	  
Close	  
Figure 1. Basic Stream Setup
2.1 Closing a stream
A Content Object contains an optional field called the Final-
BlockID. To close a stream, the writer sends a Content Object
where the FinalBlockID is set to the object’s segment number.
If no data needs to be sent, the object’s Content block has zero
length.
When a stream reader receives a final block, it should
cancel any pending interests for segments beyond the final
block.
2.2 Authenticated streams
We saw how basic stream setup is susceptible to denial-of-
service attacks because Bob does not know Alice’s identity
during the Accept phase. This could cause Bob to send un-
wanted Read Interests to some third party. In this section, we
present an authenticated stream setup.
We use the notation SAdata to mean that data is signed
by the private key of A so someone with the public key of A
could verify the signature. The notation EBdata means that
the data is encrypted with the public key of B so someone
with the private key of B could decrypt it.
Fig. 2 shows an authenticated stream setup. The initial
Interest that Alice sends to Bob contains a signed Content
Object along with a symmetric encryption key. The Content
Object name is Alice’s stream name, and it is signed with
Alice’s key. Bob may now apply a trust model to determine if
Alice is a valid user, and to determine if Alice is authorized to
use the namespace of her stream name. If Bob does not trust
the provided information, he sends a Reject Content Object
along the Interest reverse path.
Fig. 3 shows an example of Bob accepting Alice’s au-
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Alice	   Bob	  
Int	  :	  /bob/srvname/	  
{Obj:	  SA{/alice/strmid_a}::EB{sk}}	  
Open	  
Reject	  
Obj:	  /bob/srvname/{…}::	  NACK	  
Figure 2. Authenticated Stream Setup (showing Reject)
Alice	   Bob	  
Int	  :	  /bob/srvname/	  
{Obj:	  SA{/alice/strmid_a}::EB{sk}}	  
Open	  
Accept	  
Obj:	  /bob/srvname/{…}	  
::	  /bob/strmid_b	  
Int	  :	  /bob/strmid_b/%00	  
Int	  :	  /alice/strmid_a/%00	  
Content	  Objects	  encrypted	  
with	  session	  key	  
Data	  Data	  
Read	  
Read	  
Close	  Close	  
Close	  using	  FinalBlockID	  
Figure 3. Authenticated Stream Setup (showing Accept)
thenticated setup. The Accept Content Object’s name must
exactly match Alice’s Interest name, and it contains Bob’s
stream name.
2.3 Encryption
When Alice uses Authenticated Stream Setup, she may in-
clude an optional symmetric session key if she plans to encrypt
the contents of her Content Objects during Data exchange. If
she does not plan to use encryption, she may omit the session
key.
If Bob plans to encrypt his Data content, he may use
Alice’s session key, if provided. Otherwise, he must include
his own session key in his Accept response.
The protocol does not encrypt the stream names when
exchanged in authenticated Open interests and Accept objects.
That is because those names will be plaintext in the ensuring
data conversation.
All Content Objects are signed, as normal, in CCN. Alice
and Bob may verify each object as it is received.
3. Anycast and Redirection
In another scenario, the service name ccnx:/bob/srvname
may be used like an Anycast address, getting Alice to a nearby
service provider. That provider, however, may not be the best
to service Alice. In this case, the first site, bob_1 forwards
Alice’s Open interest to site bob_2, and data then flows di-
rectly between Alice and bob_2.
Fig. 4 depicts this scenario. Forwarding applies to both
Basic Setup and Authenticated Setup. The Open request is
forwarded from bob_1 to bob_2, and the Accept object
follows the reverse path of the Interests. The Accept content
object carries bob_2’s stream name, so in the Data Exchange
phase, Alice and bob_2 communicate directly without bob_
1.
In Basic Setup, the second provider does not necessarily
need to be related to the first provider. For example, Bob
could forward to Carol, so long as Alice is willing to accept
an Accept Content Object signed by Carol. In Authenticated
Setup, it may still be possible to use a 3rd party for the second
service provider, but one would need to assure that Alice’s
trust model allows for it, and that the second service provider
can decrypt the session key, if Alice included one.
Alice	   Bob_2	  
Int	  :	  /bob_2/strmid_b/%00	  
Int	  :	  /alice/strmid_a/%00	  
Open	  
Accept	  
Read	  
Bob_1	  
Read	  
Figure 4. Connection forwarding
4. Conclusion
Bidirectional Streams over Named Networks describes a gen-
eral purpose framework for two parties to open bidirectional
streams using Named networking conventions. Basic setup
does not use client authentication or encryption. Authenti-
cated Setup allows both parties to authenticate each other and
allows for optional encrypting using a session key.
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